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Perceiving, learning, and recognizing faces swiftly and accurately is of paramount 
importance to humans as a social species. Though established functional models of face 
cognition1,2 suggest the existence of multiple abilities in face cognition, the number of 
such abilities and the relationships among them and to other cognitive abilities can only 
be determined by studying individual differences. Here we investigated individual 
differences in a broad variety of indicators of face cognition and identified for the first 
time three component abilities: face perception, face memory, and the speed of face 
cognition. These component abilities were replicated in an independent study and were 
found to be robustly separable from established cognitive abilities, specifically 
immediate and delayed memory, mental speed, general cognitive ability, and object 
cognition. The analysis of individual differences goes beyond functional and neurological 
models of face cognition by demonstrating the difference between face perception and 
face learning, and by making evident the distinction between speed and accuracy of face 
cognition. Our indicators also provide a means to develop tests and training programs 
for face cognition that are broader and more precise than those currently available3,4. 
There is ample evidence for several separable yet correlated cognitive abilities in 
humans5 such as reasoning and memory. Recent debates suggest that established and 
validated concepts of human cognitive abilities should be expanded to aspects of performance 
in social and emotional contexts that can include face cognition6. The idea that abilities 
reflective of face cognition need to be distinguished from established abilities like reasoning 
and object cognition is supported by evidence from various fields. Clinical studies of brain-
damage patients with double dissociations between the perception and memory of faces and 
objects indicate the partial distinctness of the underlying brain systems7. This is supported by 
evidence from neuroimaging, which endorses the perspective that face cognition is located in 
dedicated brain regions like the fusiform face area8.  
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Based on experimental evidence and studies of brain-damaged patients, functional 
models of face cognition1,2 propose an initial stage of structural encoding common to both 
unfamiliar and familiar faces. The pictorial and structural codes extracted during this stage are 
maintained for a short period of time. If the face is familiar, so-called face recognition units 
(FRUs) will be activated. FRUs are representations of invariant facial structures of previously 
learned and now familiar faces stored in long-term memory. Following FRU activation, 
domain-general knowledge about the person and names can be retrieved. More recent 
neuroimaging studies identified the neural substrates of these modular functions9.  
Despite the interest in face cognition in experimental, clinical, and neurophysiological 
research, it is unclear whether the component processes suggested in models of face cognition 
reflect separate abilities that can vary more or less independently across individuals. It is also 
unclear how such abilities in face cognition are related to other cognitive abilities. 
Information about the number and structure of cognitive abilities can be obtained by 
analyzing the correlations of measures (indicators) collected from a large number of 
participants sampled from the application population. Our first goal, therefore, was to create a 
model that adequately captures hitherto neglected individual differences in the most relevant 
aspects postulated in functional and neuroanatomical models of face cognition. The second 
goal was to test the relationships of the component abilities of face cognition to each other 
and to established abilities like immediate and delayed memory, mental speed, object 
cognition, and general cognitive ability.  
Existing tests of individual differences in face cognition have used highly specific 
performance indicators from just one task4. However, the degree to which a single specific 
indicator captures a general ability cannot be evaluated on the basis of that one indicator 
alone. Only through reliance on several indicators is it possible to transcend specificities of 
single indicators and to measure a general ability such as face cognition. With a broad 
collection of indicators, confirmatory factor analysis can reveal the number of component 
abilities of face cognition and the relationships among them10. Common variances between 
indicators are conceptualized as latent factors, which can represent mental abilities that cannot 
be measured directly. Only by using a measurement model in which latent factors cause the 
observed individual differences in face cognition is it possible to test the exhaustiveness of a 
solution and to examine the relationships to established abilities (see Supplementary 
Information).  
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Apart from these methodological considerations, it is important that face cognition 
indicators draw predominantly on face-specific processes. For example, assessing the 
recognition of famous faces11 is conceptually problematic because it neglects differential 
learning opportunities and prior exposure to the face stimuli. In addition, many of the 
experimental and correlational studies have used portraits that include objects irrelevant for 
face cognition like other body parts, clothing, hair, or such paraphernalia as glasses12,13. 
Based on functional and neuroanatomical models of face cognition, we expected to find 
two latent factors: one related to face perception, and the other related to face memory. Both 
factors were assessed with both speed as well as accuracy indicators. Though the importance 
of distinguishing speed and accuracy of behaviour has been demonstrated14, it has been 
hitherto neglected in face cognition studies. 
Our first study established a confirmatory measurement model for individual differences 
in face cognition (see Methods). We collected, adapted, and developed 21 computerized 
indicators of face cognition, drawn primarily from popular experimental face cognition tasks. 
We ensured the psychometric quality of each indicator (see Supplementary Information) and 
tested a family of measurement models, ranging from one that postulated a single latent factor 
of face cognition to models that distinguished between processes (perception and memory) 
and dependent variables (speed and accuracy). We obtained three main results. First, 
comparisons of these models revealed among the accuracy indicators two related yet 
separable factors of face perception and face memory. Second, the face speed indicators 
required no further distinction between perceptual and memory processes. Third, indicators of 
face cognition speed were clearly separated from the two latent factors of face cognition 
accuracy. Figure 1 presents the final measurement model from Study 1 (see Supplementary 
Information for descriptions of indicators). 
Our second study aimed to replicate the measurement model, which had been derived in 
part from the data, and to enhance it by distinguishing the factors of face cognition from 
established ability factors. We selected 14 of the 21 face cognition indicators for Study 2 
based on psychometric quality, practical considerations of test efficiency, and theoretical 
assumptions confirmed and partly modified in Study 1 (see Methods). In order to distinguish 
factors of face cognition from established abilities, the study included indicators for 
established abilities that might be related to or causal for individual differences in face 
cognition. These indicators assessed immediate and delayed memory, general cognitive 
ability, mental speed, and object cognition. We successfully replicated the critical distinctions 
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obtained for the measurement model of Study 1. The fit of this model for face cognition was 
good (χ2 = 118, df = 71, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .965). The correlation between the memory and 
perception factors was higher than in Study 1 (.75 vs. .50). However, both factors were still 
sufficiently independent from one another that they can be considered separate abilities.  
As expected, a measurement model of established abilities distinguished between factors 
representing immediate and delayed memory, mental speed, object cognition, and general 
cognitive ability (see Figure 2) (see Supplementary Information for descriptions of 
indicators). The fit of this model was good. The measurement models for face cognition and 
for established abilities were integrated into a structural model that critically tested the 
relative independence of factors of face cognition from other factors. Figure 3 shows the 
structural model of Study 2. The fit of this model was also good and unequivocally indicated 
that none of the three latent factors of face cognition can be essentially reduced to established 
abilities. It is important to stress that the proportion of explained variance in the latent factors 
of face cognition did not exceed 60% of the total variance. This provides very strong evidence 
for the relative independence of individual differences in face cognition from such other 
cognitive abilities as object cognition. In the structural model, the relation between face 
perception and face memory drops from .75 to .57 once we control for other cognitive 
abilities. This indicates that, after statistically controlling relevant criteria, specificity between 
face perception and face memory remains significant. 
We show here for the first time that individual differences in face cognition constitute 
separable abilities that belong alongside other cognitive abilities. Face perception expresses 
the ability to perceive facial stimuli and to extract from them such relevant aspects as facial 
features and their configuration. Face memory represents the ability to encode and transform 
facial stimuli, and to store them in and retrieve them from long-term memory. The speed of 
face cognition captures the ability to process facial stimuli swiftly. 
These results are consistent with experimental, clinical, and neuroimaging evidence1,9. 
However, they go considerably beyond these findings by (a) encompassing face learning as an 
integral part of face memory and (b) by demonstrating that speed and accuracy of face 
cognition draw on different aspects of the mind. Furthermore, we provide evidence that 
abilities of face cognition are dissociated from one another and from established abilities. 
Face cognition represents a set of distinct mental abilities in their own right. In the long-
standing controversy about whether faces are just another instance of object cognition15,16, our 
research gives substantial support to the view that faces are indeed special. Abilities of face 
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cognition might represent a facet of social and emotional intelligence. The methods developed 
here provide a dependable measurement tool to assess face cognition abilities that can be 
applied, for example, in clinical settings or for personnel selection in jobs demanding swift 
and accurate recognition of faces. 
Methods 
The first study included 153 and the second study 209 neurologically unimpaired 
participants broadly varying in their demographic background (age ranges 18-35 years). All 
participants gave informed consent. Up to 9 participants were tested simultaneously in four 
and five hour sessions, respectively, with 10 minute-breaks about every 50 minutes of testing.  
In both studies, face perception was measured by tasks requiring perceptual comparisons 
of face stimuli without any reliance on memory processes. Face memory was assessed by 
tasks that required the learning and recognition of face stimuli. Performance in the indicators 
from these two factors was expressed by proportion of correct responses. Face cognition 
speed was measured by tasks that required swift responses for perceptual comparisons and 
recognitions of faces. Performance in these tasks was expressed by inverted reaction times of 
correct responses. The metric of the resulting scores is the number of correct trials per second. 
Accuracy in all these measures was at ceiling. In Study 2, all participants also completed tasks 
that measured general cognitive ability, mental speed, object cognition, and immediate and 
delayed memory. The tasks for object cognition were the same as the corresponding tasks for 
face cognition, but used houses instead of faces as stimuli. 
See supplementary information for more details. 
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Figure legends 
Figure 1. Final measurement model for Face cognition tasks in Study 1 
χ2 = 103, df = 71, RMSEA = .055, CFI = .963, N = 151 
Coefficients that did not reach the significance level α = .05 were italicized. Some indicators in Study 1 and 2 
contained two different conditions. The difference between two conditions (i.e. accuracy in upright versus 
inverted faces is expected to reflect a highly specific process of face cognition. Therefore, the common variance 
between two such conditions from a task is not expected to be captured completely by a latent factor. Therefore 
error variables for indicators from one task were allowed to correlate with each other. This covariance reflects 
task specificity that is of no substantive interest. 
Figure 2. Final measurement model of established abilities in Study 2 
χ2 = 152, df = 100, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .956 
Abbreviations: I & D Memory – immediate and delayed memory 
Coefficients that did not reach statistical significance at α = .05 were italicized. 
Effects of different experimental conditions of one task were captured by correlated error terms for these 
indicators. 
Figure 3. Schematic diagram for the structural model in Study 2 
χ2 = 576, df = 403, RMSEA = .045, CFI = .938  
Abbreviations: I & D Memory – immediate and delayed memory, R2 – amount of explained variance. 
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